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During over 20 years of doi moi1
Contrary to the transitional models followed by Eastern European countries, the 
dismantling of the Vietnamese central planning did not imply a decline of the 
state’s role in the economy. On the contrary, in the first years of doi moi the state 
sector actually increased as a share of GDP. The furthering of the reform process 
implied the need to rethink the state’s role and the developmental experience of 
other successful Asian industrializers became an important source of inspiration. 
However, the Vietnamese adherence to the model was limited and often 
incoherent. For instance, the major state-owned enterprises were reorganized into 
large groups reminiscent of the Korean chaebols and some government agencies 
such the Ministry of Planning and Investment and the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry were apparently modelled in accordance with the North East Asian 
examples. But the ability of the Vietnamese state to lead consistent industrial 
strategies remained limited. Coordination among different central government 
agencies and provincial authorities was low and powerful SOEs were often able 
to indulge in rent-seeking behaviours. By the late 2000s, however, a number of 
signals – like the attempt to define selective policies for attracting FDI to strategic 
industrial sectors – suggested that the developmental state model remained a key 
reference for national policymakers. A developmental state-style approach may 
become more pronounced as integration into the regional productive order 
advances, generating more resources and a wider space for manoeuvre, and 
requiring more stringent policies for successful industrial upgrading.   
 Vietnam achieved major results in terms of 
economic growth, institutional development and poverty reduction. This chapter 
argues that these results depended on a pragmatic and gradualist reform process 
that scarcely conformed to the prescription of the Washington Consensus. A 
deeper integration in the regional productive system during the 2000s contributed 
to industrial development and resulted in wider income polarization and labour-
capital conflicts. However, the new economic and social dynamics are too recent 
to draw conclusions about a possible convergence with neoliberal practices.   
 
Introduction: the Vietnamese doi moi – a pragmatic path towards unclear 
objectives (yet successful) 
 
After 20 years of doi moi Vietnam has become internationally renowned as a 
major case of developmental success. Its economy grew at an average of 7.8% 
from 1989 to 2007, with a mild deceleration during the regional economic crisis 
of 1997-98. Compared to the other large Southeast Asian economies, not only 
was Vietnam more resilient during the regional crisis, but also it was faster in 
resuming a rapid and sustained growth (Figure 1). A similar resilience was 
demonstrated in the midst of the global economic crisis:  GDP continued to grow 
at 6.2% in 2008 and at 5.3% in 2009. 
 
The rapid economic growth was to a large extent a result of the country’s 
integration into the regional productive system. During the 2000s Vietnam 
                                                 
1 Doi moi (renovation) is the name of the reform process launched by the Vietnamese Communist 
Party in December 1986. The process became particularly significant after 1989 with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. Like the Chinese case, the doi moi implied the transition towards a market economy 
‘with socialist characteristics’, without major political reforms. 
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assumed the shape of a manufacturing hub – importing capital, technology and 
intermediate goods from more advanced Asian economies and exporting finished 
products (footwear, garment, aquatic products) to the United States and the 
European Union. The strong linkage with the regional productive system also 
contributed to the country’s relative resilience. The industrial restructuring that 
followed the regional crisis (and the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis) involved the 
relocation of production to countries with lower labour costs – thus benefitting 
Vietnam, whose wages were low even by the regional standards. This process 
became even more pronounced by the mid 2000s (and especially after admission 
into the WTO) when China – due to higher labour costs and national policies 
supporting industrial upgrading – became less competitive for labour-intensive 
productions and many factories relocated from the Chinese coastal regions to 
Vietnam.  
 
< Figure 1 about here > 
 
By the late 2000s Vietnam was no paradise. Doi moi implied the de facto dismissal 
of universal public health and education through the introduction of user fees and 
the proliferation of higher-quality private services (London 2004; Gabriele 2006). 
Income inequality was on the rise. Agricultural land was scarce (the Red River 
and Mekong deltas were already overcrowded), while industry was not yet able to 
employ all the redundant labour  – but the new Industrial Zones (and sometimes 
even golf courses) were encroaching on agricultural land, with limited 
compensation for the resident families. The extension of formal safety nets was 
largely insufficient. While all these problems were casting dangerous shadows on 
the country’s social and political stability, however, there was a general consensus 
on the fact that living conditions had substantially improved for the large majority 
of the population. The reduction in poverty levels was dramatic: the number of 
families under the poverty line declined from about 58% in 1994 to about 16% in 
2006 – making Vietnam an international champion of poverty reduction.2
                                                 
2 Vietnam General Statistical Office, Living Standard Surveys 1994, 2004 and 2006. Although the 
definition of poverty lines is always problematic and the Vietnamese line is low by international 
standards (about 10 dollars per months in rural areas and about 13 in urban areas), there is a 
strong consensus that the results achieved have been impressive. The outstanding results were 
confirmed by different quantitative indicators (child mortality, access to clean water, etc) and by 
qualitative studies based on methodologies such as participatory poverty assessment (see Masina 
2006). 
 The 
impressive results in poverty reduction were, on the one hand, the consequence of 
an extended period of economic growth and relative resilience during the Asian 
regional economic crisis and, on the other hand, a consequence of the specific 
modalities in which the economic reforms had been implemented since the first 
phase of doi moi. The approach taken was gradualist and pragmatic, antithetical 
to the ‘shock therapies’ adopted by Soviet Union and other transitional 
economies. While we have no space to enter into a wider review of doi moi 
earliest stages (for this, see Fforde and de Vylder 1996; Beresford and Tran 2004; 
Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003) it is useful to underline that the reforms in 
agriculture and land tenure, and eventually agricultural diversification, 
contributed to creating virtuous circles (as originally conceived by Gunnar Myrdal) 
lifting rural families out of poverty and creating demand for domestic industry 
(see Masina 2006). Crucially, the Vietnamese gradualist approach allowed using 
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agricultural intensification and diversification to reduce the social dislocation 
produced by a rapid process of industrialization. During the regional crisis, the 
GDP composition revealed acceleration in the growth of the agricultural sector, 
as a result of explicit national policies, de facto playing an anti-cyclical function 
and supporting rural income in a period of general economic downturn (Masina 
2009). A similar pattern emerged in the midst of the global crisis, with the growth 
of the agricultural sector accelerating in 2008. 
 
After 20 years of doi moi, there is broad agreement that the economic reforms 
were largely successful, but there is no consensus on the causes of this success. I 
have discussed elsewhere these different interpretations (Masina 2006). It is useful 
to recall here that since the mid-1990s the International Financial Institutions and 
mainstream scholars have systematically criticised Vietnam for the slow path of 
the transition, in particular for delays in the reforms regarding the state-owned 
enterprises, the financial sector, the trade system, and the role of the private 
sector. The World Bank repeatedly voiced its disagreement but, considering 
Hanoi as a key customer, continued to lend to it profusely.3
 
 The IMF was much 
more explicit in revealing the disagreement, up to the point of suspending twice 
the concessional lending to the country. After the positive results achieved by 
Vietnam became known internationally, the international financial institutions 
have eventually tried to reinterpret the history of doi moi, suggesting that, after all, 
Hanoi had applied correctly the advice it received from Washington.  
While there is no doubt that Vietnam did indeed implement a number of reforms 
promoted by the IFIs, analysis of the data suggests that adherence to the 
neoliberal prescriptions was limited and ambiguous. Not only did Vietnam adopt 
a gradualist approach in contrast with the shock therapies of other transitional 
countries (promoted by the IFIs), but also, over 20 years of economic reforms, the 
country did not apply key aspects of the Washington and Post-Washington 
Consensus. The state sector maintained a prominent role in the economy and 
financial liberalization was resisted; trade liberalization was adopted through 
international agreements, but the country upheld features typical of import-
substitution; the very notion of Western-style governance (which is the cornerstone 
of the revised Washington Consensus) remained totally extraneous to the 
national political system.  
 
The resistance to the Washington Consensus was not supported by a clear 
alternative strategy.4
                                                 
3 The Vietnamese government was skilful in attracting large ODA and to use these resources to 
promote its own agenda, rather than being coerced to adopt structural adjustment policies (Painter 
2005). This was possible for at least four reasons: 1) the level of foreign debt was low, thus 
reducing the economic and political dependence; 2) a large amount of ODA came from Japan and 
conveyed a very different policy advice from the one promoted by the IFIs; 3) Vietnam was 
projected to be a success story and the different donors did not want to miss the opportunities that 
their presence in the country would offer; 4) the United States had a political interest in a strong 
Vietnam as a potential (direct or indirect) ally in ‘containing’ China and this made Washington 
based institutions (especially the Bank) more accommodating. 
 However, it is possible to argue that, after abandoning the 
central planning system, Hanoi started to look at the experiences of other 
successful Asian industrializers – Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore – in 
4 These reasons included the need to avoid confronting the IFIs and Western countries, but also 
the difficulty in charting a course in unknown waters (Masina 2006). 
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search for inspiration. The East Asian developmental state model seemed 
particularly appealing because it allowed the state to continue controlling key 
levers of the economy. Adapting the East Asian model to Vietnam, however, 
posed two major challenges for the national authorities – and by 2010 these 
challenges had not been successfully addressed. First, state-led industrialization in 
North East Asia had been implemented as a modality of capitalist stabilization. 
For the Vietnamese Communist Party there was a need to adjust the model to a 
socialist country without a major change in the nature of the political system 
(Beresford 2008; Masina 2006).  The second challenge regarded the kind of state 
capacity required to implement a coherent set of developmental state policies. 
Strategic planning is something very different from the central planning typical of 
a command economy. Strategic planning requires a skilful leadership able to use 
incentives and pressures to guide the different sectors of the economy towards 
intended outcomes. By the late 2000s the political will to nurture such a kind of 
economic and technical leadership and to grant it adequate power was still 
limited by the vested interest of major political and economic actors connected 
with State Owned Enterprises. 
 
 
In the following we will argue that the Washington Consensus and the East 
Asian developmental state presented Vietnam with two largely alternative models 
for industrial development, integration into the world economy, and 
policymaking. Based on the analysis of transformations in the industrial sector, 
our conclusion is that Hanoi took elements from both models but did not 
consistently converge with either of them.  
 
The convergence that never was – the reform of the Vietnamese 
industrial sector 
State sector and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – transitional phoenixes 
 
With the end of the war and the reunification, the central planning system was 
extended to the entire country. All the industry that mattered was state-owned. 
Compared to other more advanced socialist countries, the industrial sector was 
rather small and shaped by decades of war. Industrial development was largely 
dependent on technology transfers as a form of foreign aid. Already by 1979, 
however, it became rapidly clear that a rigid implementation of the command 
economy was not a viable solution for the country, either in agriculture or in 
industry. Economic activities started to take place outside or around the plan (for 
a review, see Fforde and De Vylder 1996; Beresford and Tran 2004). In industry, 
this implied that a number of state-owned enterprises started to search for 
underutilized inputs and to produce outputs beyond what was prescribed by the 
plan. In 1981 these non-orthodox activities were officially recognized by a 
Communist party decree establishing a ‘Three Plan System’ similar to the 
Chinese dual-pricing system. These measures (parallel to others regarding 
agriculture) can be interpreted as the beginning of the official process of reform 
and the legal basis for the transitional model. The reforms resulted in a ‘hybrid 
transitional model’ in which elements of a market economy were experimented 
with inside the planned economy (Fforde and de Vylder 1996: 13). 
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The diffusion of activities ‘out of the plan’ within a centrally planned economy, 
however, increased the imbalances in the system. The ‘Three Plan System’ had 
been introduced as an attempt to strengthen the central planning but eventually 
contributed to its demise. In December 1996, the Sixth National Party Congress 
launched a new strategy – the doi moi – that in practice introduced a systemic 
change in the Vietnamese economy and society.  
 
The first step in the reform was the abandonment of central planning. In the 
industrial sector, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) became free to purchase 
input on the market, to sell their products to trading companies or directly to  
final consumers, to retain profits and to use them at their own discretion once 
they had complied with the compulsory transfers to the state budget. Only the 
prices of a small number of products remained controlled by the state (Loc 2006: 
39). The SOEs were let free to operate on the basis of a market logic during a 
period of severe macroeconomic imbalances and in which market mechanisms 
were still rudimentary. As a consequence, most SOEs proved unable to cope and 
incurred large losses. The need for wider reforms became apparent. In the early 
1990s the government decided that non-strategic companies with a poor 
economic performance and lacking adequate capital and technology should be 
dissolved or merged with more efficient enterprises. The process resulted in a 
sharp decline in the number of SOEs: from 12,297 in 1991 to 6,264 by April 1994 
(Loc 2006: 39). Basically, the strategy adopted was that of ‘keeping the big and 
releasing the small’ (UNDP 2006: 23, for a recent review of the SOEs reform).  
 
New legislation was introduced in 1994 and 1995 to regulate the organization of 
the large SOEs into General Corporations. These General Corporations were 
composed of firms operating in the same industrial sector and apparently were 
inspired by the South Korean chaebols and the Japanese keiretsu. The SOEs were 
free to decide their investment and output, to establish business relations with 
other companies (including foreign ones through joint-ventures), to use their 
capital and to borrow from national banks.  
 
The new organization of the SOEs facilitated the revival of the industrial sector 
and contributed to high economic growth in the first half of the 1990s, until the 
economic downturn produced by the regional crisis started to impact also on 
Vietnam. In the aftermath of the crisis, new measures were taken to reduce the 
burden on the state budget from poorly performing enterprises, and to make 
SOEs better able to contribute to the country’s economic development. The new 
reforms included the launch of a wide equitisation programme under which the 
property of SOEs could be transferred fully or in part to stakeholders (employees 
and management) or to new investors (through the creation of a stock market).5
                                                 
5 In Vietnamese parlance ‘equitization’, seen as an alternative to privatization, emphasises the role 
of the management and workers as important shareholders.  
 
As in the previous phase, the equitization initially regarded small and medium 
enterprises, while the largest SOEs started to be involved only by the mid 2000s. 
Also, when the equitization process began to concern large and important 
enterprises, the state maintained a majority ownership or at least remained as a 
substantial shareholder (see Table 1). 
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Table 1: State’s Ownership in Equitized Enterprises 
 Until 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
No. of equitized enterprises  123 251 211 215 164 539 715 
State ownership ≥ 50%  12.0% 10.0% 7.2% 8.3% 8.0% 50.0% 42.0% 
State ownership 20% ÷ 50%  50.0% 46.0% 28.8% 31.7% 33.0% 18.0% 28.0% 
State ownership < 20%  38.0% 44.0% 64.0% 60.0% 59.0% 32.0% 30.0% 
Reproduced from: Perkins and Vu 2007: 24. 
 
The hesitation of the Vietnamese authorities towards a rapid equitization of large 
SOEs was partly (and understandably) related to the fact that these companies 
made an important contribution to the state budget.6
 
 The long-term motivation, 
however, was of a different nature: these companies were meant to serve strategic 
national interests. The eligibility of SOEs for total or partial equitization 
depended on the industrial sector in which they operated, and on the strategic 
importance of that sector for the country. Although the state increasingly defined 
its role as that of an investor both for fully state-owned companies and for those 
in which the state had only a majority share, it did not intend to relinquish 
control over enterprises operating in strategic sectors (UNDP 2006: 23). 
The declared objective to maintain control over key levers for industrial policy is 
obviously in contrast with the principles of mainstream (neoliberal) economics 
but is consistent with historical experience of a large number of countries,  
particularly with the East Asian developmental state.7
In other terms, the reluctance of the Vietnamese authorities to release the control 
over the state-owned enterprises could appear coherent with the intention to 
emulate the development pattern of successful Asian industrializers. However, a 
number of caveats need to be introduced regarding both the statistical data and 
the very nature of the Vietnamese SOEs. 
 To limit our comparison to 
two economies often debated in Vietnam as potential models, we can recall that 
in Taiwan, as late as in 1980, the six largest public enterprises had sales equal to 
the fifty largest private industrial concerns and that similar proportions existed in 
South Korea in the same period (Wade 1990: 178). Large state enterprises played 
a leading role in a number of heavy and chemical sectors, apart from the 
provision of public utilities. State enterprises were typically used in capital-
intensive sectors in which the level of investment was too high for private 
enterprises. And the ‘main import-substituting projects of the 1970s – petroleum 
and petrochemicals, steel and other basic metals, ship-building, and nuclear 
power – were carried out by public enterprises; and major expansion projects in 
heavy machinery, heavy electrical machinery, trucks, and integrated circuit 
production have been undertaken by public enterprises’ (Wade 1990: 178-179). 
 
According to a standard interpretation, the aim of the Vietnamese reform process 
is (must be!) convergence with a neoliberal market economy. Like every other 
developing country (and especially for a former socialist state) a key indicator of 
                                                 
6 Still in 2007 revenues from SOEs were the third most important contribution to the state budget: 
with 15.9% they followed only the revenues from oil (24.4%) and customs (19.1%).  
7 See for instance Ha-Joon Chang’s chapter in this book. I must add that the economic boom of 
my own country – Italy – after the Second World War was enabled by large state-owned 
enterprises in all the strategic sectors (from steel to oil, from telecommunications to energy) and 
by state-owned banks that dominated the national financial sector.  
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the success of the transition is the shrinkage of the state sector in the economy. 
Interestingly, in Vietnam the GDP state sector share increased during the first 
years of doi moi from 31.1% in 1991 to 40.5% in 1997. This share remained 
around 39% until the mid 2000s and then declined to about 34% in 2008.8
 
  
The relative decline of the state sector in the economy since the mid 2000s was 
the result of faster growth of the national private sector and the foreign invested 
sector. This could be read as good news for neoliberal observers; but a closer 
review of the data reveals a reality in contrast with the convergence hypothesis – 
or, at least, suggests that the convergence was less pronounced than it may seem.  
First, as the equitization process gained momentum, a number of companies 
previously reported as ‘state’ came to be counted as ‘non state’. In a majority of 
these companies – and certainly in the largest and most important – the state 
maintained a substantial control (up to 50% of registered capital). That is, the 
government came to control a large number of enterprises classified as ‘non state’. 
Although a precise calculation is almost impossible, the output of this state-
owned share of the ‘non-state’ sector must account for a few GDP points. 
 
Second, similar considerations can be made for the foreign invested sector. 
Within this sector, the number and importance of one hundred percent foreign-
owned companies started to increase by the mid 2000s, but a very large number 
of companies remained joint ventures – and the Vietnamese partner in the largest 
joint ventures was always an SOE. Still in 2006, among the 212 largest foreign 
invested companies by size of capital resources, 88 were joint ventures. In the 
same year, the join-venture contributed for 44.4% of the net turnover of the entire 
foreign invested sector (GSO 2008). Also in this case, a precise estimate of the 
SOE’s share of the output produced by the foreign-invested sector is not available, 
but it must be a very significant amount.  
 
The data on the industrial output value by ownership structure (Figure 2) show 
an even larger relative decline of the state sector due to a very rapid increase of 
the foreign-invested sector in the second half of the 1990s and an acceleration of 
the non-state sector since 2001. As we have just seen, however, these data do not 
reveal the effective dimensions of the state as an important shareholder for both 
non-state and foreign invested enterprises.9
 
 Further, recent qualitative research on 
equitized enterprises suggests that, through administrative and legal mechanisms, 
the state continued to exert a hold well beyond the amount of shares it officially 
controlled (Gainsborough 2008). 
< Figure 2 about here> 
  
The permanence of a very large state sector in the Vietnamese economy after the 
doi moi is even more a conundrum for mainstream scholars because it coexisted 
with a track record of macroeconomic stability and high GDP growth. Such was 
the trouble for neoliberal scholars and institutions in making sense of the 
                                                 
8 GSO data online. 
9 As the equitization process advances, joint ventures with foreign investors are created by non-
state enterprises in which the state maintains significant shares. Thus, the understanding of what 
is what – state, non-state and foreign invested – becomes even more complex. (I thank Do Ta 
Khanh for this comment.) 
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Vietnamese reform process that since the mid 1990s they have repeatedly 
predicted a collapse of the national financial system, or a strong deceleration of 
growth, or the inability to recover after the regional crisis, or the fleeing away of 
foreign investors – only to see their doom prophecies contradicted by 
performances constantly above those of the other large Southeast Asian nations 
(Masina 2006). More to the point, Adam Fforde explained the apparent paradox 
for which a large state sector coexisted with high economic growth with two very 
pertinent observations: first, that the SOEs should be understood as ‘virtual share 
companies’ controlled by a wide range of ‘virtual shareholders’, blurring the 
divide between private and state; second, that the rent-seeking behaviours that 
could have derived from a similar situation were kept at bay by a very 
competitive environment (Fforde 2004 and 2007). These observations shed light 
on the complex relationship between the state, the state sector, and the politically 
connected urban bourgeoisie. On the one hand, looking at the state-enterprises as 
‘share companies’ reveals a key feature of the Vietnamese transition and explains 
the large support the doi moi continues to have among the emerging middle-class. 
The creation of a modern capitalist class from within the state sector may 
nonetheless become a major challenge for a socialist country as Vietnam 
(Gainsborough 2002; Masina 2006). However, the existence of a high level of 
‘competitive clientelism’ among different groups inside and around the state-sector 
has contributed to a higher level of efficiency in the use of resources (Fforde 2007: 
3), thus explaining the overall positive contribution to the state sector to 
economic growth during the reform process. 
 
As rightly reminded by Melanie Beresford (2008), a blurred distinction between 
the state and the private sectors is quite common in East Asia. The Vietnamese 
hazy industrial structure should be understood against the backdrop of the 
regional experience. Thus, while we argued that for over twenty years of doi moi 
the state sector has maintained a paramount position in the economy, we should 
also underline that it is not always clear what exactly the state sector is and who 
controls it. Contrary to mainstream perceptions, Bersford (2008) indicates that 
government support towards SOEs has been substantially ambiguous since the doi 
moi: while the presence of a strong state sector was seen as an essential instrument 
for a market economy with socialist characteristics, the state enterprises 
continued to receive little financial support (as in the pre-doi moi era). The 
financial weakness of SOEs forced them to explore different strategies in order to 
continue operating. For instance, it became common for SOEs to enter into 
trading activities, or even to form joint ventures with foreign partners, in fields far 
from their core business. The diversification of the business portfolio allowed 
many SOEs to obtain financial resources for their core activities but also created 
tensions in the economy. The lack of a capable and coherent government 
coordination of state enterprises became apparent in the late 2000s and was as 
such discussed openly in the Vietnamese media. For instance, in 2008, large 
SOEs were considered responsible for an overheating in the real estate market 
also contributing to inflationary pressure. A number of scandals – notably, in 
summer of 2010, the case regarding Vinashin (the conglomerate dominating the 
shipbuilding industry) – were associated with excessive diversification and poor 
governance. 
 
The same SOE weakness was also a major obstacle for their equitization, as their 
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managers and workers were reluctant to lose state protection without any 
guarantee that the privatized firm would be able to survive in the open market 
(Painter 2005). The lack of financial resources, or possibly of a clear strategy, 
made the Vietnamese government maintain the SOEs – especially the largest ones 
– in the peculiar position of state enterprises with private sector characteristics – 
that is, they were given the autonomy to provide for themselves. Even the 
creation of the General Corporations, which was meant to allow a stronger 
coordination of specific industries, failed to provide an adequate instrument for 
industrial policy (Painter 2005: 271). 
    
 
The rise of the private sector around state-owned industry 
 
Since the early 2000s, the major change in Vietnamese industry was the rise of a 
privately owned national sector. Two laws, in 2000 and 2005, simplified the 
procedures for establishing new firms and defined a single regulatory framework 
for all the national enterprises, regardless of their ownership. After the Enterprise 
Law of 2000 the number of registered private firms increased very rapidly (also 
giving legal coverage to companies that had so far operated informally): between 
2000 and 2005 over 160,000 new private firms were established, corresponding to 
almost five times the number of these created during the 19990s (Perkins and Vu 
2007: 25). The major increase in the number of private enterprises also resulted in 
a rapid growth of the industrial output generated by this sector (Figure 2). 
 
The Enterprise Law of 2005 was intended not only to consolidating the private 
sector but also to creating a level playing field for all the national enterprises – 
that is, this law became the key reference also for the SOEs. As we saw already, 
by the time in which the second Enterprise Law was approved the non-state 
sector also comprised a large number of equitized SOEs (in which the state often 
maintained substantial shares). This obviously increased the support to more 
clear rules for the entire industrial sector. 
 
Notwithstanding its increasing importance, by the late 2000s the Vietnamese 
private sector was still dominated by small and medium enterprises. A UNDP 
study indicates that in 2007, among the largest 200 Vietnamese enterprises, 122 
were state-owned, 56 were foreign invested and only 22 private. The same study 
also indicates that a small number of very large companies dominated their 
respective industrial sectors in terms of share of total labour, assets, turnover and 
tax payments, and this was particularly the case for the SOEs and the foreign 
invested enterprises (see Table 2). Their prominence was such that the study 
concluded that ‘in some [industrial sectors], the largest firms are the sector’ 
(UNDP 2007: 3). 
 
Table 2: The position of the largest 200 companies, 1997 
 Share of top 200 on total number enterprises 
  Total number In top 200 Labour Assets Turnover Tax 
State 4,083 122 29.6% 65.5% 41.9% 41.5% 
Private 105,167 22 1.9% 13.7% 4.8% 4.6% 
Foreign 3,697 56 15.9% 10.1% 24.3% 67.8% 
Source: UNDP 2007 
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The high level of concentration was particularly relevant in those strategic sectors 
in which the SOEs maintained their leading function. The fact that by directing a 
small number of companies – large by Vietnamese standards but not much by 
international ones – it was possible to control an entire industrial sector was seen 
by some observers as an enabling condition for developmental state-style 
industrial policy (Perkins 2001). At the same time, the mushrooming of small and 
medium enterprises around state-owned giants reminds onr of the 
industrialization patterns of other Asian economies such as Taiwan and more 
recently China.  
 
The position of private industry in the Vietnamese economy, however, also 
presented clear differences from the North East Asian model. In Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan, the private sector was subjected to clearly defined industrial 
strategies (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990) or was part of tight cooperative and 
coordinated government-business relations resulting in ‘governed 
interdependence’ (Weiss 1995). In the Vietnamese context the private sector 
seems to be scarcely addressed by the quite embryonic industrial policy defined 
by the Ministry of Industry, which still sees as its only leverage the SOEs (and to 
a much lesser extent the regulations for FDI). Even after the recent 
transformation into the Ministry of Industry and Trade – with a name that seems 
to evoke the once-powerful Japanese MITI – it seems still to lack an adequate 
strategy for the private sector.   
 
High dependence on FDI – the perils of a foreign-led integration into the regional economy 
 
From the start of the economic reform the Vietnamese government was quite 
open toward foreign direct investment. Foreign capital was seen as a major 
resource for increasing the level of investment in the economy, contributing to the 
diffusion of new technologies and capabilities, and helping to generate 
employment in the industrial sector. Already in the early 1990s – after withdrawal 
from Cambodia and the end of the Western embargo – the FDI flow to Vietnam 
became sizeable. By the mid-1990s, also due to the speculative tendencies existing 
in the region, foreign direct investment to Vietnam was over 2 billion US dollars 
per year, that is, above the level of Thailand and the Philippines, but also of 
Taiwan, South Korea and India (Masina 2006).10
 
 After the regional crisis, the 
FDI flow declined to more realistic levels for the size of the Vietnamese economy 
until the mid 2000s. Then, in 2006, when Vietnam was finally admitted within 
the WTO, the inflows increased tremendously to reach 8 billion US dollars by 
2008 (Figure 3).  
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
 
                                                 
10 Such a high level of FDI flows was obviously unsustainable for the Vietnamese economy as the 
comparison with other countries in the region easily reveals. In the months before the regional 
crisis unfolded, however, the World Bank used the argument of a relative contraction in FDI 
commitment (from Asian countries whose economies were already facing difficulties) to push for 
a doi moi 2, that is an acceleration of the reform process.   
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The volume of FDI flows indicates the importance that this country is assuming 
in the regional division of labour and, increasingly, as a market – one should not 
forget that with more than 85 million inhabitants it has the 13th largest population 
in the world. However, the significance of foreign investment for the Vietnamese 
economy is even more evident as a contribution to gross fixed capital formation 
(Figure 4). The FDI share reached a peak of around 25% in 2007 and 2008 while 
on average it was above 15% in the decade 1995-2005. This level of contribution 
to the gross fixed capital formation was far  above the level of developing 
countries in general and of China and Southeast Asia in particular. 
 
< Figure 4 about here> 
 
The ability to attract such a high volume of foreign investment can be understood 
as a further positive indicator for the Vietnamese economy. The appeal of this 
country as an expanding manufacturing basis was confirmed by two assessments 
conducted by UNCTAD, indicating Vietnam as one of the most attractive 
locations for foreign investors: the World Investment Prospect Survey ranked 
Vietnam respectively number six in 2007 and number eleven in 2009. Also on the 
positive side, most investments were connected to green-field operations rather 
than to the acquisition of national firms – thus contributing to a net increase in 
employment generation (mostly in manufacturing, but also in services).  
 
On the negative side, a high reliance on FDI implies the risk of a reduction in 
national sovereignty and dependency. In this regard, the Vietnamese case clearly 
departs from those of South Korea and Taiwan, in whose industrial development 
FDI played only a marginal role. This departure from the developmental models 
of the first generation of Asian NIEs cannot be attributed to decisions by the 
Vietnamese government. Rather, it depended on the changed nature of the 
regional productive order since the late 1980s. Although the so-called flying geese 
model described by Akamatsu can be criticized for its exploitative nature, it 
allowed technology diffusion and industrial upgrading to the first Asian NIEs. 
Under specific historical conditions, the East Asian developmental state was 
compatible with a system of regional division of labour that enabled vertical 
mobility both for countries and firms. In parallel with the diffusion of 
neoliberalism in the Western hemisphere, the organization of the regional 
productive order became much less favourable and the countries at the bottom of 
the regional subcontracting system were exposed to an increased competitive 
pressure connected to the inclusion of China in the system (Hart-Landsberg and 
Burkett 1999). While in the 1960s and 1970s a typical Japanese firm would rely 
on independent subcontractors (to which it was ready to transfer technology in 
order to guarantee adequate standards), in the 1990s and 2000s the same firm 
would rather operate through FDI – relocating production overseas but 
maintaining a proprietary control over technologies and patents.   
 
Given the changes in the regional division of labour, a development strategy 
highly dependent on FDI may be a risky business, although it may also be the 
only possible choice. This is, in any case, the path that Vietnam increasingly 
adopted since the mid 1990s, reaching the status of major manufacturing hub in 
labour-intensive production by the mid 2000s.  
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The case of Singapore (and to a lesser extent, Malaysia) indicates that, even in an 
open economic environment and with an industrialization strategy highly 
dependent on FDI, it is still possible to implement successful industrial strategies. 
In Singapore the government was able to guide foreign investments to specific 
targets through incentives (and disincentives), thus facilitating a positive process 
of industrial upgrading (Chang 2006b). The experience of Singapore was 
considered by the Vietnamese government as a valuable source of inspiration – 
but very little was done in trying to emulate it. On the contrary, during the 2000s 
the decentralization of licensing for foreign investment below a certain ceiling 
resulted in a fierce competition among the Vietnamese provinces, with an 
excessive proliferation of new industrial zones and a scarce assessment of the 
concrete benefits that the foreign invested projects would bring to the country. By 
the late 2000s the situation had become so critical as to be officially recognized by 
the Ministry of Planning and Investment in its Mid-Term Review of the Five-Year 
Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006–10 (MPI 2009: 51). Policy measures were 
being discussed at the time of preparing this text – although the critical question 
will be the ability to implement new policies that require stronger guidance over 
(often undisciplined) provincial authorities. 
 
It should also be added that in the first phase of doi moi the creation of joint 
ventures with SOEs had also contributed to give some leverage for state guidance. 
However, in the second half of the 2000s, the weight of joint ventures was 
declining significantly, either because foreign partners took over existing 
companies or new investments were directed towards fully foreign-owned 
operations (Beresford 2008).11
 
 As it was to be expected, joint ventures continued 
to dominate in terms of net turnover in the extraction of oil and natural gas, but 
maintained a very important role also in heavy industry, chemicals and 
automotive – sectors in which the SOEs had a typical stronghold. By contrast, 
joint venture became less important in export sectors such as garment and 
footwear, and almost insignificant for hotels and restaurants (GSO 2008). 
An emerging manufacturing hub – with ambitions for industrial upgrading 
 
The position of Vietnam as an emerging manufacturing hub is confirmed by the 
data on investment and trade. On the investment side, the data indicate that the 
bulk of FDI originated from Asian countries since the launch of doi moi and this 
trend was confirmed during the 2000s. For the entire period from 1988 to 2008, 
Asia accounted for almost 70% of committed FDI.12
 
  
The position of Vietnam as a new manufacturing hub emerges even more clearly 
by a review of trade flows composition after admission in the WTO. The review 
(conducted on the Comtrade database online) reveals that by 2007 the main 
import components were producers and intermediate goods, i.e., the five largest 
                                                 
11 Vietnamese unofficial sources suggest that some joint ventures were intentionally mismanaged 
by foreign partners in order to facilitate their take over by foreign parent companies. The case of 
Coca-Cola is often quoted in this regard.  
12 In the period 1988-2008, the share of Asian countries as counterparts of FDI licensed projects 
was (calculated on current US dollars): Taiwan 14%, Malaysia 12%, Japan 11%, South Korea 
11%, Hong Kong 5%, and Thailand 4% (source: Vietnam General Statistical Office, Online data). 
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sectors were mineral fuels (14%), machinery and mechanical appliances (14%), 
electrical machinery and equipment (9.5%), iron and steel (9.0%), plastics (5.7%). 
The export structure, instead, besides crude oil (20.7%), was dominated by labour 
intensive manufactured goods: apparel (8.6%), footwear (8.4%), aquatic products 
(6.8%), electrical machinery and equipment (6.7%).  
 
For both exports and imports, Asian countries were the largest partners, but with 
the typical asymmetries of a country importing machinery and intermediate 
goods from higher echelons in the regional multilayered subcontracting system 
and exporting labour-intensive consumer goods to industrialized countries. The 
position of Vietnam as a new Asian manufacturing hub was clearly visible in the 
trade balance: in 2007 Vietnam had a large trade surplus with the United Sates 
and the European Union, an even balance with Japan, and a large trade deficit 
with the other East Asian countries (Figure 5). 
 
< Figure 5 about here > 
 
Although we suggested at the beginning of this chapter that the high inflow of 
FDI and the increased exports of manufactured goods helped Vietnam in coping 
with the regional and global crises, the position of a manufacturing hub is 
problematic for at least three reasons. First, the country may be trapped in weak 
relations with those countries and companies that dominate the sector, thus 
having limited scope for local value adding. Second, there may be a tendency to 
concentrate on sectors in which the country has a comparative advantage, thus 
being confined to labour-intensive production with limited profit margins. Third, 
in an increasingly competitive environment, depending on cheap labour may 
imply a strategy that applies downward pressure on workers’ wages, rights and 
skills. Up to a certain extent all these negative tendencies were visible in Vietnam 
at the end of 2000s.  
 
At the time of writing, it is not possible to assess the long-term implications of the 
steep increase in FDI flows into the Vietnamese economy since admission to the 
WTO. A crucial challenge will be the ability to increase value adding in existing 
industries and to achieve industrial upgrading towards more value-added 
production. Results in this direction were very positive in the first phase of doi moi 
accordint to Perkins and Vu:  
 
Between 1990 and 2005 industrial (and construction) value added grew at an 
average annual rate of 10.9 percent for a 4.72 fold increase over the fifteen 
year period. This rate was only marginally lower than the extraordinarily 
high growth rate of industrial value added (including construction) in China 
over the 27 years between 1978 and 2005 of 11.3 percent per year (Perkins 
and Vu 2007: 22). 
 
The question of increasing the value-added contribution for national industry is 
certainly of paramount importance for Vietnam in the post-WTO admission 
phase. At the end of the 2000s, leading Vietnamese scholars were discussing the 
risk that the country may face a ‘middle-income trap’, once having achieved the 
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status of ‘low-middle income’ country.13
 
 The risk of ‘middle-income trap’ was 
presented to Vietnam by Keinichi Ohno (2009) in an article suggesting that no 
ASEAN country has been able to break through the invisible ‘glass ceiling’ 
between the existing national system with a supporting industry still dependent 
on foreign guidance and a national system in which management and technology 
have been internalized and mastered. Vietnam, which is still at the stage of simple 
manufacturing under foreign guidance, according to Ohno (2009), should start 
developing industrial policies that prepare the ground for an eventual breaking of 
the ‘glass ceiling’. By the late 2000s, however, there was no concrete indication 
that Vietnam was preparing to implement clear and consistent policy measures to 
guide national industrial development. Both MPI and the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade were defining new plans – e.g., a decree on support for industry and 
rules for improving supervision of FDI inflows – but it will take a few years to see 
if these policies, adopted in response to the new challenges and opportunities 
deriving from the WTO accession, will coalesce into a meaningful industrial 
policy.  
Conclusions – liberalization without neoliberalism, development 
without a developmental state 
 
In over twenty years of doi moi the Vietnamese leadership at party and 
government level has never presented a coherent project for the reform process. 
The development of a modern economy was officially presented as a necessary 
condition to strengthen the socialist state – but the implications in terms of social 
and class differentiation produced by the economic reforms were never really 
examined (at least publicly). The reform process dismantled central planning and 
the role of the communes in agriculture, liberating the animal spirits of capitalism. 
The demise of the socialist free provision of services such as health and school 
was only in part compensated by a still very rudimentary welfare system. Social 
inequality increased, especially between urban and rural areas and among 
different regions in the country. The industrialization process entailed land 
dispossation for many rural workers, especially for the creation of a very large 
number of Industrial Zones. The inclusion of Vietnam in a regional system of 
division of labour implied that many rural workers moved to urban areas in 
search of industrial employment – and often found very harsh working conditions 
and a precarious livelihood… And yet, Vietnam could hardly be considered a 
showcase for neoliberalism.  
 
First, the Vietnamese reforms incorporated a transformative project that was 
distant from, and often contradicting, neoliberal prescriptions. The state remained 
at the centre of the economic reform, increasingly giving space to the market, but 
not renouncing a guiding role (although in unclear terms). The many reforms 
introduced in over twenty years certainly improved the system of governance, but 
the transition towards a neoliberal model of governance was very limited. Both in 
industry and in the banking system the state retained very strong leverage. The 
                                                 
13 Comments received during interviews at the Vietnamese Academy for Social Sciences and at 
research centres within the Ministry of Planning and Investments (MPI) and Ministry of Industry 
and Trade in 2009 and 2010. 
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notion of a rule of law above the rule of politics still sounds heretical in Vietnam. 
In other words, some measures promoted by the Post-Washington Consensus 
have been implemented but overall the system remains quite distant from its 
vision. 
By the late 2000s the role of the SOEs in the national economy was increasingly 
contested even within the Communist Party. On the one hand, it was criticised 
the waste of national resources produced by poor management and involvement 
in dubious economic operation. On the other hand, the largest SOEs considered 
being too independent from state control (and actually often able to influence 
policy decisions at government and party levels). Even this new debate, however, 
may lead to outcomes far apart from those prescribed by neoliberal advocates. A 
weaker position of the SOEs in the system may actually increase the ability to 
implement state-led development strategies.  
 
Second, throughout the world the neoliberalization entailed a strong income 
polarization, with a small minority absorbing an ever-growing share of national 
wealth. In Vietnam, segments of the urban bourgeoisie used connections and 
political protections to create large assets, often through corruption. However, the 
main trend is represented by a general improvement of living conditions and the 
emergence of a rather large middle-class. Income inequality has increased, but not 
dramatically.  
 
Third, industrial labour – especially in the export-oriented private and foreign 
invested sectors – is exposed to a global ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of rights and 
wages. The working conditions are often so arduous that the country has become 
known for a large number of industrial strikes, organized without the support of 
the national trade unions, and therefore illegal by law. Yet, when the workers go 
on strike the (state-controlled) media very often give wide and sympathetic 
coverage. The trade unions and local authorities intervene asking that the 
workers’ demands be met, at least partially, and the workers are not punished for 
the organization of illegal strikes. There is no doubt that labour in Vietnam is 
exposed to severe exploitation (as it was in Taiwan and Korea at a similar level of 
economic development). But it does not appear that the Vietnamese state is 
promoting a neoliberal agenda – on the contrary, the legal framework is quite 
supportive of labour rights, although the enforcement of these rights is very weak.  
On each of these points, Vietnam presents conditions relatively different from 
China: less income polarization, much less inequality, and more attention to 
labour conditions – although industrial upgrading in China has already resulted 
in substantial wage increases for urban industrial workers in coastal areas. 
 
If the reforms and liberalization in Vietnam cannot be too easily understood in 
terms of neoliberism, so too the country’s developmental stance cannot be 
entirely inscribed under the banners of the East Asian Developmental State. 
Probably the Vietnamese experience is closer to the model of the first Asian NIEs 
than those of other Southeast Asian countries -- such as Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia, (although all were at least partially influenced by Japan and the other 
tigers). In key areas, however, the Vietnamese case departs significantly from the 
North East Asian model. In the North East Asian-style industrialization process, 
the strategic sectors were selected on the basis of a strategic industrial policy. The 
aim of industrial policy was to lead national firms towards specialization in 
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selected, more advanced industries and higher value-added production. State 
support was granted to facilitate the acquisition of new technologies and new 
capabilities. Vertical integration was a typical element of industrial policy and the 
existence of industrial conglomerates (notably in Korea, much less in Taiwan 
where instead SOEs played a major role) supported the achievement of this goal. 
On the contrary, the Vietnamese definition of strategic sectors is much more 
dependent on the attempt to defend national sovereignty in important industrial 
sectors than on a concerted effort to create competitive advantages (in the manner 
of the NEAsian states).   
 
With admission into the WTO, Vietnam has become a significant manufacturing 
hub, increasing its integration into the regional multi-layered subcontracting 
system. Although a large FDI flow is helping to create jobs in the industrial 
sector, the experience from the other ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines) indicates that the regional productive order is 
much less favourable to technology spill-over and industrial upgrading than it was 
in the first decades after World War II. In this context, in the future Vietnam may 
try to promote policies to support the development of national industry (both 
private and state-owned) towards a higher level of technological and managerial 
capabilities. While current evidence suggests that the country is still missing a 
strong and clear industrial strategy, East Asian-style policies continue to be seen 
by scholars and policymakers as an alternative to ‘market-driven’ Washington 
Consensus policies. As to whether the Vietnamese developmental trajectory will 
continue to maintain a degree of autonomy from the neoliberal project, however, 
will depend on the evolution of the capital-labour relation. It is highly unlikely 
that integration into the global and regional productive system will enable labour-
friendly policies in a country at the bottom of the commodity-chain. But the state 
may still try to promote a transformative project serving also the medium and 
long-term interest of the working class. Alternatively, a revision of the 
developmental state model could be adjusted to accommodate the prevailing 
neoliberal tendencies in the capitalist systems – possibly achieving some industrial 
upgrading but at the price of a radical rupture of Vietnamese society and the 
complete demise of the socialist project. Both scenarios are open at the present 
and they will also depend on the evolution of the international economic and 
political system. The results achieved over twenty years of doi moi, however, give 
space to a moderate optimism. While the objective of socialist orientation is very 
unclear in terms of concrete policymaking, the notion of equity and national 
solidarity may be strong enough to guide the country through the challenges 
ahead.  
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Figure 1: GDP Growth, 1991–2009 
(ASEAN 6) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Online, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Industrial output value by ownership structure (%) calculated at current prices,  
1996–2007 
 
Source: GSO Statistics online 
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Figure 3: FDI inflows – ASEAN5, Millions US$ at current prices, 1986–2009 
 
Sources: UNCTAD, World Investment Review, online database. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, 1995–2009 
 
Sources: UNCTAD, World Investment Review, online database. 
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Figure 5: Trade balance with major partners, Millions US$, 2007 
 
Source: Vietnam General Statistical Office, Online database. 
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